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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENT 
The buck stops, doesn't it? 
President Putin's Kremlin website has a fabulous photograph from February 9, 
featuring a bemedalled Ivan Yakovlevich Novikov holding red carnations as he is 
awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd class, by President Putin. (1)  Putin 
smiles warmly at the veteran, whose expression seems so joyous, you just know 
that Putin must have slipped a free bus pass in with the new medal. 
 
Granted, there never was going to be a good time to kick pensioners and 
veterans off the dole, but does the presidential press service really believe that 
photo ops with veterans and oily praise of their service and bravery dripped over 
a policy speech will staunch the flow of protests? 
 
The pensioners' revolt (mixed in with the general discontent of all the other 
previous beneficiaries of government subsidies, such as military personnel) does 
seem to have had an impact, albeit not a particularly effective result.  Despite the 
Kremlin's clear authoritarian bent, a sliver of responsiveness to citizens' 
concerns, certainly a hallmark of democratic governance, remains:  the Duma felt 
compelled to take a vote of no confidence in the Fradkov government.  Granted, 
it failed, but it does suggest a vestige of constituent service (perhaps even more 
hopeful is the interpretation of the vote as political haymaking, which suggests 
the opposition, such as it is in the Duma, isn't totally cowed).  
 
Likewise, certain government members have accepted personal responsibility for 
the implementation of the monetization reforms.  At least, I think that's what they 
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did:  Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin spoke unequivocally of his failings to the 
Duma, "If we made mistakes in some respects, I can say that in this sense, we, 
of course, to an extent, left the president and the Duma exposed, in so far as 
there was a need for timely and rapid adjustment whilst these decisions were 
being implemented." (2) 
 
Putin's response to the crisis, such as it was, seems to consist of public curtness 
toward his ministers.  Hence, reports of a recent government meeting play up the 
"public roasting" of ministers, as Putin scolds Kudrin over the slow 
implementation of payment increases for the military and his attempt to excuse 
his efforts:  "Leave out the commentary.  Just do it, and then report." (3)  The 
next stage of presidential response is predicted to take the form of a 
reorganization of the government.  
 
While dismissals certainly are likely, the President's personnel decisions will have 
little to do with actual policy or competency issues.  The monetization of benefits, 
as difficult as it most certainly is, will stand as a reform, perhaps watered down 
for some sensitive groups (more likely for the military than the pensioners, 
despite the protests).  The expansion of government benefits during the Yel'tsin 
administration, which Putin correctly highlighted in his January government 
meeting (and noted in the last NIS Observed), may have taken some of the sting 
out of the monetary reforms – such as the revaluation of the ruble and its 
eventual devaluation – but could not be supported by an unsteady Russian 
economy.  Putin may yet "sacrifice" some ministers to soothe the popular outrage 
– the government, after all, is composed primarily of holdovers from the Yel'tsin 
era, and economists whose ties are closer to Anatoli Chubais than to the current 
president. (4) 
 
The criticism and possibility of dismissal of certain government ministers 
(namely, Gref, Zurabov and Kudrin) brings a familiar division within Putin's circle 
into high relief.  Once again, the "liberals" (economic reformers) and the siloviki 
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are portrayed as locked in a zero sum contest for the president's ear.  As was the 
case when Putin first took office, the President's own political beliefs are not at 
issue, nor are they known.  The relative closeness of one faction over the other 
to the Kremlin center of power occupies political, economic and security 
forecasters as they attempt to gauge the relative stability of Russian leaders, 
markets, nukes and a myriad of other issues.  It is a strategy that worked well in 
the Soviet era and continued throughout the Yel'tsin presidency.  When it comes 
to Putin's Kremlin however, it seems more productive to distinguish among the 
various realms that each faction is allowed to dominate:  despite rampant rumors 
in Putin's first term, Sergei Ivanov was not going to be appointed as Prime 
Minister to oversee economic reform; his place is with the military, security 
services or some eventual hybrid.   (Conversely, in Yel'tsin's administration 
bodyguards, tennis players, and immediate family were placed in positions of 
astonishing authority based on a loyalty test, rather than an assessment of 
competence.) 
 
While there are still important economic reforms to tackle, Putin is likely to leave 
the economists (Chubais' cadres) in charge.  At the same meeting in which Putin 
spoke sharply to Kudrin, he later heard a report from German Gref, the Economic 
Development and Trade Minister, that the government was pressing ahead with 
the ever controversial land reform.  Gref informed the president of the need to 
establish a "delimitation of land ownership rights between the state, constituent 
entities, and municipalities." (5) 
 
If that isn't going to be controversial enough, Gref also referred to an issue sure 
to prove nightmarish, "the buy-out of plots of land under privatized buildings." (6)  
Putin acknowledged the importance of Gref's undertaking, as a "very acute 
issue." (7)  When the tough economic decisions have been made and the fallout 
for their social consequences exacted however, the composition of the next 
government Putin forms could prove most interesting. 
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Poppies! Poppies! 
A quick check in on Putin's drug tsar reveals that Viktor Cherkesov has been 
keeping busy with that fight against drug traffickers.  In a meeting at the end of 
last month with the president, Cherkesov noted that "international law" calls for 
much more stringent penalties against narcotics traders and for those dealing, 
not just with the drugs themselves, but "drug precursors." (8)  In Russia, as in 
other countries, the issue centers on the trade in heroin emanating from 
Afghanistan.  
 
While Cherkesov did not propose legislative reform to deal with the sentencing 
problems involved with adjudicating drug offenses in Russia (he instead 
emphasized the need for a maturation of the judicial system), he did offer to 
submit proposals to Putin that would bring Russian law into line with international 
norms, and would deal with the thorny issue of drug raw material and precursors.  
Poppy lovers take heed. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1) www.kremlin.ru 
2) NTV Mir, 1900 GMT, 21 Jan 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic 
database. 
3) "President gives Kudrin a public roasting," by Oksana Yablokova in Moscow 
Times, 8 Feb 05 via Lexis-Nexis Academic database. 
4) See previous issues of the NIS Observed, Executive Branch for details of the 
Fradkov Government's pedigree. 
5) ITAR-TASS, 7 Feb 05 via Lexis-Nexis Academic database. 
6) Ibid. 
7) Ibid. 
8) RIA Novosti, 28 Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis Academic database. 
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Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
In a period in which the Russian government has such control of the media, it is 
interesting that we hear and read a good deal of disaffection towards and even 
within the government in the press.  Notably, in recent weeks we have seen 
numerous stories about the impact of benefits reform on the security services.  
While benefit reductions made news earlier in the year with demonstrations from 
old age pensioners who demanded that lost benefits be restored, only recently 
have we been made aware of the impact of monetization on the security 
services.  Like the pensioners, security service personnel lost access to free 
transportation to and from the workplace, among other benefits.  While this may 
seem trivial, apparently this had been a significant element of compensation, 
long considered an entitlement for public workers.  The transportation loss has 
prompted many in the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Interior Ministry 
(MVD) to work on developing creative alternatives:  Some personnel have 
requested to leave work early because they have been forced to walk home; 
others have claimed they can only work certain days of the week in an attempt to 
limit costs; some have even brought bedding into work to avoid the commute; 
and others have submitted resignations, claiming that the new costs for 
transportation amounted to "41 per cent of my monthly wage." (1) 
 
Although it does not appear that members of the security services actually will 
resign en masse or even take to the streets protesting the loss of transportation, 
their dismay illustrates just how the government-supported barter economy has 
been such a critical element in the lives of so many workers, the real cost of such 
actions, and the deleterious impact it has had.   Various responses have been 
outlined by the government:  the Interior Ministry announced it will raise salaries 
for employees by 50% to compensate for the loss of benefits (the loss of 
transportation plus property taxes, another benefit cut). (2)   The Finance Ministry 
announced a proposal to subsidize long-distance train transportation, providing 
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50 rubles per person transported, a subsidy expected to total 8.5 billion rubles in 
2005. (3) Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, in an unrelated meeting, announced 
that the FSB's budget will increase by 25%, although it is not clear whether this 
was a previously announced increase for 2005.  Interestingly, according to the 
report, "Fradkov said that some parts of the FSB budget have grown so much 
that the agency is already having trouble spending all the money."  (4)  Among 
the benefits not yet cut, but closely monitored, is a free prescription benefit.  
While collecting payment information for government benefit recipients, Health 
and Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov "asked the heads of regions 
and health institutions to continue strict control over the dispensation of 
medicines to benefit recipients." (5) It seems the minister is concerned with the 
exploitation of the system of black market diversion of medicine.    
 
The minister points out a major effect of monetizing the economy by cutting 
benefits—reducing the trade in subsidized goods and services that has for years 
provided the opportunity for government workers to enjoy a better quality of life 
than pure financial compensation would indicate. Granted, giving free rides on 
public buses or even trading in prescription medications, is not the type of 
corruption to which President Putin referred when he blasted federal forces for 
enabling terrorists in Russia, but it is not a stretch to say that such actions are 
steps along a spectrum of conduct not so far removed from more familiar, and 
more detrimental, forms of corruption.  To wit:  "Arkadi Yedelev, chief of the 
regional operational staff for controlling the anti-terrorist operation in the North 
Caucasus, said that everyone [including federal soldiers in addition to Chechen 
separatists] abducts people. Chechen Prosecutor Vladimir Kravchenko said that 
a tenth of all abductions are committed by the security and law enforcement 
agencies."  (6)  These "abductions," in many cases simply detainments made 
possible by the role security services personnel play in the region, are conducted 
for ransom.  Additionally, nameless FSB officers were alleged not only to abduct 
people for money, but FSB commanders also are said to condone such acts in 
order to create a climate of fear in order to keep outsiders away from the 
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Caucasus region, which leaves the security services free from outside scrutiny.  
(7)    
 
This may help explain the recent announcement from an Interior Ministry 
spokesman that Russia "intends to [involve more actively] private security 
organizations operating on Russian territory in the protection of facilities from the 
threat of terrorism."  (8) Acknowledging the spotty reputation private security 
firms have for excessive force, Leonid Vedenov, chief of the assessment and 
licensing directorate of the Department for the Protection of Public Order of the 
Russian Federation Interior Ministry, pointed out the Interior Ministry personnel 
also have been the subject of investigations into similar acts.  He noted that the 
quality of such firms has improved recently, and the market for their services is 
on the rise.  In fact, about half a million security personnel work for private 
security firms, with about 40% having prior experience in the police or federal 
forces.  (9)  This appears to be a method effectively to deputize such personnel 
as they continue to protect both public and private facilities.  The challenge is to 
create an effective legal framework that allows such personnel to coordinate their 
activities and share information with government services, building a network of 
security through which, it must be hoped, terrorists will be less capable of 
penetrating.  No mention was made of how their services would be 
compensated.  Such a framework apparently will allow the administration to 
leverage security personnel who are privately employed—effectively getting free 
help without having to rely on the state budget for more money or benefits or 
compensation.  And thus, the Russian government would receive a benefit of its 
own. 
 
So it is with even greater curiosity that we see a separate announcement 
regarding the FSB—it has been tasked publicly with spying on industry to "help 
[the administration] provide an effective legal foundation, make decisions on 
equal competition conditions, develop business and create a favorable 
investment environment," said Prime Minister Fradkov.  The administration 
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appears frustrated by what it perceives as the use of "state secrets" by other 
countries or corporations to gain an advantage in "international negotiations."  In 
making the announcement, Fradkov acknowledged the possibility of corruption, 
either by having individuals share "state secrets" with corporations or looking the 
other way when faced with suspect corporate practices.  He emphasized that the 
state will be on guard for such actions.  It is understandable that the Russian 
government would want the best advantage, but it seems odd this sort of tasking 
would be discussed publicly.  Fradkov, however, specifically stated, "The 
authorities and citizens have the right to expect returns from what the country is 
investing in the FSB."  (10)   Perhaps the public exposure is an attempt to ensure 
both the public and FSB agents themselves understand what is expected of 
them. 
 
Finally, we also now see government agencies pitted against one another for 
resources.  Defense Ministry announcements of changes in compulsory service, 
including reducing the number of draft deferment categories, have reduced the 
pool of candidates from which other agencies recruit.  Previously, time spent 
serving in the Interior Ministry, for instance, precluded mandatory service in the 
military.  In fact, the Defense Ministry has long been frustrated with the Interior 
Ministry:  "Every year they siphon off up to 15,000 conscripts under oath."  To 
avoid this in the future, the Defense Ministry is attempting to change the 
interpretation of the law that allows exemptions from military service.  (11)  In 
anticipation, perhaps, of losing conscripts back to the Defense Ministry, the 
Interior Ministry has essentially adopted a Moscow secondary school.  This 
official relationship, expressed in a resolution from the ministry, will train students 
in some of the fundamental skills used by Interior Ministry personnel, and ensure 
these students remain physically fit for duty.  The announcement stated that such 
students will be better prepared for further education at Interior Ministry-run 
schools.  (12) This move, presumably will help create a pool of career Interior 
Ministry officers who will then be unavailable for military service. 
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The most interesting report, however, is that President Putin has expressed 
dissatisfaction with parts of the anti-terror bill that was passed recently through 
the first of three readings in the Duma.  (13)  The major provisions of this bill, as 
discussed previously, include giving the FSB on-scene commander authority 
over all other government personnel involved in a terrorist response operation; 
giving the local FSB commander the lead in developing procedures for 
responding to such events; granting authority, in general, to detain family 
members of terrorists and hostage-takers in attempts to bring such events to an 
end; and the introduction of Terrorist Threat Modes (TTMs), declared by the on-
scene commander (even when, in some cases, there is not an actual terrorist 
event taking place).  One of the implications of a TTM declaration is the ability to 
restrict media access to the scene.  (13) 
 
Reportedly, President Putin's concern is not with the enhanced role of the FSB 
(which has a speckled record of success in such events) or even with the 
detainment of terrorists' relatives; he is against the bill's planned media 
restrictions during terrorist events. According to Vedomosti, "Putin had told 
parliament he feared the section of the bill relating to journalists reporting of such 
attacks violated Russia's existing press law."  While President Putin previously 
has favored press restrictions, he now either does not favor restricting the kind of 
press coverage we saw during the Beslan siege, or does not wish to be seen 
favoring them.  (14)  Possibly he has taken note of the worldwide sympathy his 
country received following the publication of images and accounts of the Beslan 
siege from all manner of media sources and reporters, and the favorable, if brief, 
support his administration received from other states in the days that followed. 
 
Is this an indication that the Russian president has begun to change his 
restrictive and authoritarian ways?  Unlikely, given only this evidence.  This 
announcement, however, does bring us back to the fact that, given President 
Putin's moves to consolidate power, there are still opportunities to criticize his 
administration. Undoubtedly, there is a vast amount we cannot observe through 
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the media, but the parts that we can observe appear quite revealing, showing a 
state in transition and turbulence.  And in these revelations, perhaps the 
president is beginning to learn a lesson in statesmanship that many expected he 
could not. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) BBC Monitoring, "Russian Soldiers Quit 'En Masse' In Protest At Benefits 
Reform," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 21 Jan 05, via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) "Interior Ministry To Compensate Cancelled Benefits For Police," Interfax, 26 
Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) "Govt Reviews Monetization Law, Promises To Solve Problems," ITAR-Tass, 
24 Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Valeria Korchagina, "Fradkov Asks Spies for Economic Aid," Moscow Times, 
31 Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) "Government Reviews Monetisation Law, Promises To Solve Problems," 
ITAR-Tass, 24 Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Yelena Shesternina, "Everyone Abducts People,"  Russkii kurier, 2 Feb 05, 
from What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(7) Vyacheslav Izmailov, "Special Delivery Services:  Do FSB agents get the 
ransom for abducted foreigners?"  Novaya gazeta, 27 Jan 05 via ISI Emerging 
Markets. 
(8) BBC Monitoring, "Russian Police See Antiterrorist Role For Private Security 
Firms,"  ITAR-Tass, 2 Feb 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Valeria Korchagina, "Fradkov Asks Spies For Economic Aid," Moscow 
Times, 31 Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis; and "Government Hopes For FSB's Broader 
Security Role In Economy," Interfax, 28 Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) Yuri Tretyakov, "The Military Agencies Share Conscripts: The Army Wants 
To Replenish Its Ranks At The Expense Of The Police," Trud, 12 Jan 05; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(12) Svetlana Alikina, "Interior Ministry Acts As Guardian Of Moscow School," 
ITAR-Tass, 28 Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume IX, Number 19, 9 Dec 04. 
(14) "Russia's Putin Objects To Anti-Terror Law,"  Reuters, 2 Feb 05 via 
Johnson's Russia List # 9046. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
Serious about Syria 
Bashar al-Assad made his first visit as Syrian president to Moscow in January, 
and his talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin were said to be "a milestone 
in bilateral relations." (1)  The main result was the signing of a declaration of 
friendship and cooperation, with the hope that it will open new opportunities for 
business ties, cultural exchanges, and maintain traditional areas of cooperation 
in hydro energy, oil and gas production and transport construction. A solution 
was found regarding Syria's debt to Russia, a long-standing issue between the 
two countries, one that will provide a stimulus for their economic ties. (2) Both 
leaders said they supported continuing peace talks in the Middle East, the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab lands occupied since 1967, and the 
creation of a Palestinian state. (3) Support for UN initiatives, UN reform, the war 
on terror and the desire for Iraq to maintain territorial integrity were also matters 
upon which they agreed. (4) 
 
Moscow's desire to assist Arab regimes and regain a greater position in the 
Middle East was evident during the Assad talks and a recent visit by Palestinian 
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (see below). This could put Moscow in a 
difficult position with Washington, however, as the U.S. and Russia find 
themselves on opposite sides of many important issues in the region. Russia's 
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reported plans, for example, to export Iskander and tactical missiles to Syria, a 
state sponsor of terrorism, drew a sharp rebuke from Washington. (5) 
 
Influence in the Middle East? 
President Putin demonstrated an interest in cooperation with Middle Eastern 
states and reasserting Russia's role in the region during his talks with the 
recently elected President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. 
According to Putin, this meeting was a positive development in Russian-
Palestinian relations, a continuation of what Yassar Arafat—"a sincere friend of 
our country"—began years ago. (6) 
 
Development of economic ties and support for the Putin administration's efforts to 
bring about economic recovery, humanitarian relief issues in Palestine and 
scholarships for Palestinian students—the largest aid package that Russia 
allocates to any Middle Eastern country—were discussed. (7) Concerning peace 
negotiations, both leaders support a speedy normalization of the situation and 
the creation of an independent Palestinian state, which, according to Putin, "has 
the right not only to exist, but has the right to a secure existence." (8)   
 
Abbas stated, "Russia should play an important part in international relations 
both through its own initiatives it puts forward and through the role it plays in the 
quartet of international mediators." (9) Putin pointed out that the Middle East lies 
in close proximity to Russian borders and that this, as well as the Middle East's 
direct impact on the world economy and on the energy sector, in which Russia 
holds a particular place, determine that Russia should play an active role 
regarding the Middle East settlement issue. (10) 
 
In spite of Putin's desire for a greater role in the Middle East, some political 
experts, such as Aleksei Malashenko, acknowledge that Russia will be unable to 
promote Palestine's interests effectively "as it does not have the money, ideas or 
levers of influence to do so." (11) Malashenko further asserts that Russia can 
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only maintain its position as a world leader and retain its presence in the region 
by force of inertia. It must be remembered that the talks between Putin and 
Abbas are "only words." (12) 
 
A six billion dollar deal 
The secret is out concerning Rosneft's purchase of Yuganskneftegaz. Rosneft, 
the leading state-owned Russian oil company, borrowed $6 billion from Chinese 
banks through VneshekonomBank in order to secure what was formerly the 
largest oil-producing subsidiary of YUKOS. (13) The Chinese bank loan seems to 
be aimed at securing long-term oil supplies from Rosneft. (14) Controversy 
surrounds this deal and the involvement of Chinese banks complicates the 
matter. Analysts have stated that the deal appears to have been structured via 
the banks rather than directly from company to company in order to avoid 
potential legal consequences for China National Petroleum Corp. The director of 
Group Menatep, YUKOS' majority owner, said the involvement of the Chinese 
banks was clearly aimed at complicating the deal and that CNPC would face 
legal action. (15) But regardless of the outcome of the controversy, there will now 
be "a little loan from China in every barrel of Yugansk oil." (16) 
 
Not an outcast—for the time being 
At a recent meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice communicated the hope that Russia would show a 
greater commitment to fundamental components of democracy in the coming 
years, and demonstrate cooperation with former Soviet republics where 
democracy is beginning to take hold. (17) According to Rice, there will be no 
radical revision of bilateral relations because present day Russia "is not the 
Soviet Union and a return to the past is out of the questionŠ." (18) Rice's first 
meeting with Lavrov, though essentially positive, underscored a comment she 
recently made in Washington: "We are keeping an eye on the strategy [of 
Russia's development –Vremya novostei] and decide what to do on the basis of 
these evaluations." (19) Though the U.S. is monitoring developments in Russia, 
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"generally speaking, America's position remains unchanged. Russia is not cast 
out for the time being." (20) 
 
These talks were meant to pave the way for the upcoming Bratislava summit with 
President Bush and President Putin. The summit will focus on bilateral economic 
issues with both sides understanding "the need to make a leap forward in [our] 
cooperationŠachieve a real expansion of business contacts in the energy and 
high technology sectors and ensure a steady rate of growth in investment." (21) 
Russia's accession to the WTO in light of current negotiations with the U.S., 
continuing cooperation in the war on terror and weapon disarmament and the two 
countries' policies in the former Soviet Union are matters that will also dominate 
the summit. The post-Soviet territory is a source of tension and potential conflict. 
Although Putin stated recently, "Stop telling me that no country other than Russia 
can act on post-Soviet territory," competition is one thing and an attempt to 
neutralize Russian influence is another. (22) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Press Statement by the President of Russia Vladimir Putin and the President 
of Syria Bashar al-AssadŠ," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 27 Jan 2005. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty via Johnson's Russia List, 14 Jan 2005, 
#11-JRL9016; (www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9015-11.cfm). 
(6) "Press Statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of the 
Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud AbbasŠ,"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation via JRL, 1 Feb 2005. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
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(9) Ibid. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) RIA Novosti via JRL, 1 Feb 05, JRL#9044; 
(www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9044-27.cfm). 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) "A Little Loan from China In Every Barrel of Yugansk Oil." Nezavisimaya 
gazeta; 2 Feb 05 via What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets, 1.4. 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) "Chinese Lend Rosneft $6Bln for Yugansk." The Moscow Times, 2 Feb 05 
via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(16) Nezavisimaya gazeta via WPS via ISI Emerging Markets, 2 Feb 05, 1.4. 
(17) AOL News, 5 Feb 2005; 
(http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20050203063609990003). 
(18) Vremya novosti, 3 Feb 2005 via What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging 
Markets,; 1.1 "The United States Perceives Too Much Power In the Kremlin." 
(19) Ibid. 
(20) Ibid. 
(21) "Russia-US Talks in Ankara to Pave Way for Bratislava Summit". ITAR-
TASS; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(22) RIA Novosti via JRL, 1 Feb 2005, JRL #9044; 
(www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9044-24.cfm). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
Pensions continued 
 16 
"We have to admit today that we have lost at a moral and political level," said 
Russian Regional Development Minister Vladimir Yakovlev about the recent 
scuffle over the monetization of benefits. (1)  Elderly pensioners took to the 
streets in protest over the inadequacy of the funds that replaced the in-kind 
benefits they had previously been receiving. Several Duma deputies proposed 
dismissing the government in the wake of the first spontaneous protests seen 
during Vladimir Putin's presidency. In response, the government announced that 
it would increase pensions by an average of 240 rubles. (2)  
 
Benefit reform seems to have backfired on the Putin administration, although 
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin is laying the blame elsewhere. "The president is 
not to blame for the initial faults in the reforms," said Kudrin. "We are already 
aware of our errors; we let him down." (3)  According to Kudrin, discretion on the 
implementation of monetization was left up to regional leaders, based on the 
assumption that they would know best how to manage the transition. That 
assumption proved faulty as transportation benefits claimed the spotlight. 
However, four regions already have begun the process of complete monetization, 
including Tatarstan, without any negative backlash. The failure of most regional 
leaders to implement monetization successfully may give support to Putin's 
decision to appoint governors in the name of strengthening the power vertical. 
 
Although Kudrin cites regional leaders as a primary source of the problems, it is 
the Duma that seems to be on the receiving end of the public's wrath, according 
to a recent survey. The survey said that only 3 percent of Russians think the 
Duma is doing a good job. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed rated the Duma as 
doing "bad" or "very bad." The benefit reform issue is revealing an interesting 
facet of Russian politics. Those with little real power take the heat for problems, 
while those who consolidate the power vertical sidestep the public's ire. Putin's 
ratings are falling, but not nearly to the extent that the Duma's have plunged. The 
Duma, as an institution, has been so thoroughly emasculated by Putin's reforms 
that it now serves as little else but a rubber-stamping scapegoat - but a 
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scapegoat that, until recently, has received everything free except its mobile 
phones. (4) 
 
Gubernatorial elections vanquished 
Russia conducted its last direct election of governors on February 6. The event 
took place, with minimal protests, by about 100 people, many of whom were 
members of the Yabloko and Union of Right Forces political parties in Nenets 
Autonomous District. (5) 
 
Meanwhile, Putin recently suggested that regional leaders tender their 
resignations. In exchange for early voluntary compliance with the recently passed 
law eliminating the direct election of governors, Putin proposes to consider their 
appointments himself rather than putting them through the screening process 
conducted by his regional envoys. (6)  Sergei Darkin of the Primorye territory 
(located on Russia's Pacific coast) was the first governor to accept the 
president's invitation. In late January, he requested Putin's formal approval for his 
re-nomination. (7)  On February 1, he offered the regional legislature his 
resignation and asked for their confirmation in his nomination as governor. (8) 
The Primorye legislature approved Darkin's request almost unanimously on 
February 4. 
 
Darkin's appointment marks the formal shift from direct elections to appointment 
by head of the executive branch with confirmation by the regional legislature. The 
legislature may be dissolved if they consistently fail to confirm the president's 
nominee. Although this initial appointment has proven unproblematic, the sticking 
point for the new legislation will be the ethnic republics such as Tatarstan. 
Tatarstan's president, Mintimer Shaimiyev, has opposed the caveat allowing the 
president to disband parliaments for failing to confirm his appointee. (9) 
 
And the mayors start to fall? 
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Obninsk, the second largest city in Russia's Kaluga region, recently became the 
first town with an appointed mayor. Vladimir Morozov was named mayor in early 
February by governor Anatoli Artamonov. (10)  The move may be the first step 
toward a Kremlin-proposed plan to scrap the direct election of municipal leaders. 
Kaluga's legislature also passed a law establishing elections for a town council in 
each town throughout the region. Once elected, it is the council's job, according 
to the new law, to appoint a mayor for their town. The decision to appoint 
Obninsk's mayor has drawn criticism for revoking citizen's rights, as well as 
sparking allegations of a Kremlin conspiracy. The actual impact remains to be 
seen. 
 
Marching Without Putin 
A new youth organization determined to bring the 'Orange Revolution' to Russia 
has formed. Marching Without Putin, an organization whose title plays on the 
pro-Putin youth movement Marching Together, has vowed to work to bring 
democratic elections to Russia by 2008. Some members of Marching Without 
Putin purportedly were involved in the protests at the recent gubernatorial 
election in Nenets Autonomous District. (11) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Russian Regional Development Minister Interviewed, Izvestia, 4 Feb 04 via 
Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #9050. 
(2) "Russia's basic pensions to increase to 900 rubles from 1 March," 
INTERFAX, 27 Jan 05 via WNC. 
(3) "We misjudged the situation," Kommersant-Vlast, 31 Jan 05 via ISI Emerging 
Markets. 
(4) "Russian State Duma deputies may give up certain fringe benefits," Izvestia, 
4 Feb 04 via JRL #9050. 
(5) "Small protest as Russia conducts last gubernatorial election," Associated 
Press Worldstream, 6 Feb 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(8) "Russian regional leader wins Putin's nomination under new law," Associated 
Press Worldstream, 1 Feb 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
The impact of the monetization of social benefits on the armed forces has been 
significant and maybe not even fully appreciated yet.  Short-term readiness 
deficiencies caused by the reform are real and nearly comical.  Lt. General 
Vladimir Shamonov, Deputy Prime Minister for the Social Protection of 
Servicemen, cited examples of units unable to travel to their posts because they 
had no money to pay for the public transportation upon which they relied.  "An 
honor guard platoon which was supposed to be present when meeting a foreign 
delegation also wasn't allowed into the subway.  In this case the soldiers turned 
around and returned to the barracks." (1)  The Minister of Defense, Sergei 
Ivanov, still claims that the reforms are good, just poorly implemented.  Failure on 
the part of the Ministry of Defense to prepare for the inevitable impact of the 
reforms with alternative ways to fund troop transportation, leaves local 
commanders scrambling, as always, to find creative ways to overcome resource 
shortages, so the troops might accomplish the mission. 
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Desirability and prestige of military service 
The benefits reform also accelerates the decline in the socio-economic status of 
servicemen.  This will certainly have both short and long-term implications for the 
combat readiness of the Russian military.  President Putin's announcement at the 
end of January that servicemen will receive a 20% pay raise this year appears as 
his attempt to douse an already raging political brush fire.  Although Putin's effort 
came quickly, and would be significant if actually acted upon, it still is unlikely to 
undo the damage to the armed forces that has already occurred.  The Kremlin 
and the Ministry of Defense appear not to be sensitive to the fact that the 
benefits, as noted by a military analyst with the group Generals for Democracy 
and Humanism, "have always brimmed with symbolism, highlighting the prestige 
of military service in the public eyes." (2)  Combined with the reduction of benefits 
in retirement, this reform strikes a significant blow to the socio-economic status of 
the armed forces. 
 
This most recent decline in the economic condition of Russia's servicemen only 
accelerates the trend of the past two years.  While Ivanov claimed that the troops 
he visited recently in Siberia actually have benefited from the reform, the reality, 
according to a Defense Ministry survey, is that 80% of servicemen oppose the 
action. (3)  According to the same poll, only a meager 5% of servicemen are 
content with their current economic well-being, down dramatically from 20% 
contentment just 2 years ago.  Of course, with no salary increase to keep pace 
with inflation despite a modest attempt in October 2003, servicemen are 
experiencing a real income decline in pay. (4)  The inability to house servicemen 
is still a major failing of the MOD, and Ivanov has reported to President Putin that 
more than 134,000 military families are without housing; the current plan to 
remedy this situation already extends beyond 2015. (5)  
 
Shamonov gets to the heart of the issue when he predicts "with a high degree of 
probability—that with the decline of prestige of military service because of the 
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cancellation of benefits and a number of other aspects, there will be a problems 
with attracting contract servicemenŠ.I can say with the very same degree of 
probability that an outflow of junior officers will begin." (6)  Again, the reality is 
that retention is already a major problem, especially among junior officers, and 
the impact is already having a deleterious effect on military capability.  According 
to an Auditing Chamber report, almost one third of lieutenants quit the military 
within a year of graduating from a military institute. (7)  A chronic shortage of 
officers has required the military to draft officers into the armed forces that were 
trained in the military departments of civilian schools.  These officers (30,000 to 
40,000 per year), who in the past had been allowed to serve in the reserves but 
were not drafted into the active force, are being called to duty in far greater 
numbers than back in 1999 and are almost as numerous as those officers 
graduating from military colleges.  The system of military departments at civilian 
schools was created, according to Ivanov, "to enable students not to serve in the 
army but become officers of reserves without serving." (8)  The programs vary in 
their effectiveness, but in general, the level of training provided to graduates of 
these programs is far inferior to that provided to the military college graduate.  
Because the Russian armed forces have not yet developed a professional NCO 
corps, the preponderance of the responsibility for training conscripts falls to the 
junior officers.  According to experts "when they find themselves in the troops, 
lieutenants from military departments know less than the conscripts." (9)  
 
Recruitment of contract soldiers is also a problem.  Ivanov recently has tried to 
lower the public's expectations of the transition to a contract force, conceding that 
Russia will always need conscripts to fill out the one million man armed forces 
that he says are required to secure a country of ten time zones.  "Theoretically," 
Ivanov noted, "it is possible [to create a contract military], but practically it is 
unrealistic." (10) 
 
What Ivanov means is that he is incapable or unwilling to provide sufficient 
resources to make contract service attractive enough to fill the ranks of the 
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Russian army.  While the conversion to contract soldiers progresses haltingly in 
other regions, professional units assigned in Chechnya never have a shortage of 
soldiers applying to serve there.  This is most assuredly due to the fact that the 
average professional soldier serving in Chechnya makes three times what a 
soldier makes in Pskov (home of the other completely professional unit, the 76th 
Airborne Division), even before combat pay is considered. (11)  At the right price, 
individuals interested in military service increase in number and even improve in 
quality. 
 
But there is more to the "desirability" of a military career than just pay.  A 
significant source of the pride associated with a military career has been 
extinguished through extensive decay of discipline and moral fiber in the armed 
forces.  Highlighting this was a report recently released by the General 
Prosecutor's Office, which concluded that "the crime rate in the army and other 
security structures has increased; theft and beatings have become a serious 
problem." (12)  According to Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, more than 
R1.7bn has been stolen or embezzled by servicemen in the last two years.  
Ustinov notes that "the volume of kerosene stolen from the Army would be 
enough to organize four months of flight training for a regiment of the MiG-29 
fighters." (13)  These are official government figures; The reality is likely many 
times worse. 
 
There is also new information documenting that life in the military is increasingly 
dangerous.  Novaya gazeta recently published an article citing an anonymous 
Duma source who claimed that 10,799 servicemen have died in non-combat 
related incidents over the past five years.  Because this information was relayed 
the day after Sergei Ivanov had briefed Parliament, the information is purported 
to have originated with him.  With incredulity, the article goes on to compare the 
more than 2,000 deaths per year in the Russian army with the 1,000 deaths per 
year suffered by the Soviet army while in heavy combat in Afghanistan, and the 
1,300+ deaths suffered by the U.S. in its nearly two-year-old Iraqi campaign.  
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Regardless of the precise causes of these deaths (left unclear in the article), the 
high number of losses prompted the  author to note that "It appears the Russian 
army is conducting a heavy and exhausting warŠagainst itself and suffering huge 
losses." (14) 
 
Ivanov's track record and his plan 
Ivanov knows the armed forces are in a social crisis.  He knows that the decision 
to reduce the length of conscripted service from two years to one year by 2008, 
"a major task of national importance identified by the President," presents an 
additional challenge ahead, especially when combined with Russia's negative 
demographic trends. (15)  By failing to support even inflation-matching pay raises 
for the servicemen in 2004 and 2005, by supporting the monetization of benefits 
(which substantially hurt the soldier economically), and by failing to provide 
enough money for an aggressive transition to contract service, Ivanov 
demonstrates that he is trying to resolve problems on the cheap.  The core of 
Ivanov's solution still appears to center on conscription.  His plan to improve the 
quality of personnel serving in the Russian armed forces was to increase the 
talent pool from which the military drew its troops by removing deferments.  He 
was forced to back away from that plan early in 2005 because the government 
could not withstand the political heat generated by the issue.  But student 
soldiers would not have been helped, as pointed out by Pavel Felgenhauer, "the 
Soviet mass conscript army with university students as foot soldiers did 
miserably in the war in Afghanistan in the late 1908's." (16)  Even if the 
deferments were eliminated, well-to-do parents would find another way to keep 
their children from serving in a military as abusive and dangerous as the Russian 
military is today.  
 
Military analysts like Pavel Felgenhauer continue to assert that the real answer is 
to modernize the Russian military personnel system by recruiting and retaining 
talented officers and continuing the transition to a force of professional soldiers, 
especially at the NCO level.  But what makes the military profession more or less 
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attractive?  Apparently Ivanov thinks he can increase the prestige and status of a 
military career by preaching to the public on a national patriotic TV station run by 
the Ministry of Defense, and by making "basic military preparedness" compulsory 
in Russian schools.  Studies by the Russian Armed Forces Sociological Center 
show that the same culture that allowed the military to survive the extreme 
conditions of the past 15 years still exists today, but is declining.  The bedrock of 
officers who still feel compelled to serve the fatherland are a shrinking plurality in 
today's Russian military. (17)  More and more frequently material security—
including housing—is playing a role in the decisions of young men and women 
with regard to a career in the military.  As society's esteem for the military 
declines, so too do the social motivations to make the military a career.  The 
creation of a professional force, along with the elevated awareness of economic 
well-being in modern Russian society is causing the economics of a military 
career to become more important.  Civilian salaries in Russia are much higher, 
even the salaries of servicemen in Kazakhstan and Belarus are higher than that 
of the Russian soldier. (18)  Economic realities add to the negative pressures 
already eroding the Russian military. 
 
Failure of the Russian military to reverse the negative trends in the socio-
economic status of servicemen will have a long-term impact on readiness.  In 
addition to the ongoing problems with crime and corruption, increased problems 
with retention and recruitment are sure to reduce the effectiveness of the force.  
Each generation plays an important role in the evolution of a professional military 
and if a generation is marred by defective elements, or simply by flight, it will take 
several additional generations to undo the damage that undoubtedly will occur. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Benefits Monetization Threatens the Armed Forces," Nezavisimoye 
voyennoye obozreniye, 27 Jan 05 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL). 
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EXTERNAL 
President Putin at the Russian Security Council 
Russian President Vladimir Putin gave his first Security Council address since 
Russia's ill-advised intervention in Ukraine's presidential elections and the 
subsequent election of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko.  President Putin 
highlighted lingering Russian fears over further NATO expansion, but promised 
to increase cooperation with the alliance.  President Yushchenko, inaugurated 
just days prior to Putin's speech, repeatedly has made it clear that he will push 
for Ukrainian membership in NATO.  Russia opposes membership for Ukraine 
based on several emotional reasons linked with its enduring self image as a 
superpower, but actual security concerns include: the location of the Black Sea 
Fleet in the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol and the thousand mile plus border 
Russia would have with NATO, if Ukraine joined the alliance. 
 
Putin's discussion of increased NATO cooperation in this year's address was 
significantly different from his last Security Council speech in July 2004.  
President Putin then focused on Russia's preeminent role within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.  He stated, "Russia's role in increasing 
the influence and authority of the CIS is highly significant." (1)  At the same time, 
he acknowledged, "We (Russia) are facing increasing political and economic 
competition with the CIS (region)." (2)  
 
The Kremlin's desire to strengthen the CIS seems to have accomplished little in 
stemming the tide of frustration within some former Soviet countries.  President 
Putin is now facing the question, of how to return Russia to its previous 
greatness without political and military domination of the post-Soviet lands.  
Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have made it more difficult for Russia to 
influence political processes across the near abroad.  This new reality finally may 
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force the Russian government to find other avenues, outside of bullying, to 
further its agenda within its proclaimed "sphere of influence." 
 
Russian attitude calmly negative 
During his speech, President Putin emphasized a long-standing component of 
Russian foreign policy, "As before, we are convinced that there is not an 
arguable basis for the geographic expansion of NATO." (3)  
 
Andrei Kelin, Deputy Director of the European Cooperation Department in the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, put it this way, "As far as our attitude to the 
(NATO) expansion is concerned, it remains calmly negative." (4)  He also said, 
"To put it briefly, there is nothing good in the NATO expansion for Russia.  And 
we have both military and political objections." 
 
Russia's primary concern with former Soviet states joining NATO appears to be 
the growing dependence of the NIS on NATO's system of decision-making, both 
in the political and military arenas.  The influence that Russia once wielded over 
these countries has dissipated with NATO's expansion; without this influence, 
Russia finds itself with less control over the post-Soviet sphere. 
 
The secondary issue is Russian residual distrust, notable after the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, particularly after the 1999 Kosovo conflict.  NATO basically enlarged 
its military mission to include out-of-area operations in a region whose problems 
did not directly threaten any member states' security, but did threaten European 
stability as a whole.  After NATO's action against the Serb-dominated rump 
Yugoslav state, 96 percent of Russians either agreed or totally agreed with the 
proposition that "NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia is a crime against humanity," 
and 77 percent either agreed or totally agreed that "there is nothing stopping 
NATO from getting involved in Russia as it did in Yugoslavia." (5) 
 
Options for Russia-NATO Cooperation 
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If President Putin is serious about significantly increasing cooperation between 
Russia and NATO, certain options present themselves: strengthening or altering 
the existing NATO-Russia Council; establishing a new joint NATO-Russia 
command; or moving toward the inclusion of Russia as a full NATO member. 
 
Option 1 – Strengthen the NATO-Russia Council.  Contacts in the context of the 
NATO-Russia Council are usually high level.   Direct military to military 
interaction or cooperation is often limited to a single exercise.  The council could 
set up a standard annual exercise schedule, increase the numbers of lower level 
personnel exchanges, and look for creative ways to promote military technology 
sharing.  Strengthening the council in these ways would probably not have any 
immediate effect on interoperability for either Russia or NATO.  
 
Option 2 – Establish a joint NATO-Russia Command.  With the prospect of 
significant changes to U.S. force disposition within Germany and even Korea, the 
opportunity exists to establish a joint Russia-NATO command.  The command, 
headquartered in Russia, could help eliminate Russian fears of NATO troops 
massing on its borders.  The command's mission focus should be something 
relatively low tech, such as joint peacekeeping, stabilization and reconstruction.  
Focusing in these areas, the command would be able to deal with security 
concerns on both sides, while at the same time allowing the inclusion and 
participation of all troops regardless of their readiness level. 
 
Option 3 – Russia steps on the path toward full NATO membership.  In 1995, 
NATO advised potential new members that the general membership criteria were 
as follows: (1) an established democracy (with individual liberty and the rule of 
law); (2) respect for human rights; (3) a market-based economy (with social 
justice and environmental responsibility); (4) armed forces under civilian control; 
(5) and good relations with neighboring states (with the resolution of internal 
ethnic disputes).  The current situation in Russia appears to be diverting ever 
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further from this "western" model.  Currently, it is not useful to discuss Russian 
NATO membership.  
 
Conclusion 
NATO will remain the key provider of European security and stability for the 
foreseeable future.  Russia already has chosen a course of cooperation with 
NATO.  If President Putin truly wants to take the NATO-Russia alliance to a new 
level, Russia must overcome psychological scars it carries from the Cold War.  
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted at the Russian-U.S. Council for 
Economic Cooperation, that current U.S.-Russian relations still bear traces of the 
past, featuring "attempts to play a zero sum game." (6) 
 
Russia, not the United States or NATO, is fixated on the idea of keeping its 
superpower "sphere of influence."  Russia's inability to deliver security and 
stability to the former Soviet states will only provide the impetus for continued 
NATO expansion.  Russia simply cannot compete—even in their own backyard.  
NATO and the United States will not limit their own military or political initiatives 
in any post-Soviet region based solely on Russia's historical claims.  Ukraine, 
Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are in various stages of the NATO membership 
process.   Increased NATO-Russian cooperation certainly could be mutually 
beneficial, but until Russia overcomes its self image problems, it is not likely to 
happen. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press service,                
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Yulia Timoshenko—Prime-Minister 
Last Friday, the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada approved Yulia Timoshenko for the 
post of the Prime-Minister with a vote of 370-0. Shortly thereafter, Timosheko 
announced the members of her government, notably: First Deputy Prime Minister 
Anatoliy Kinakh, Interior Minister Yury Lutsenko, Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk, 
Head of the Secret Service Oleksanrd Turchinov, Deputy Prime Minister on 
European integration Oleg Rybachuk, and Deputy Prime Minister on 
Administrative Reform Roman Bessmertniy, among others. (1) 
 
Earlier, Timoshenko stressed that a candidate's beliefs, goals, and intents, not 
arbitrary personal characteristics, should be the main criteria when selecting any 
political candidate for a government position. The presentation of her "Toward 
the People" action plan consisted of five main subsections: Fairness, Harmony, 
Life, Security, and the World. Timoshenko started the presentation of her 
program by underlining the importance of spiritual education, faith in God, in 
Ukraine, and in the people's own abilities to build a corruption-free, prosperous 
state. Timoshenko, reaching out to the wide Ukrainian population, emphasized 
the importance of offering equal opportunities to all Ukrainian children, regardless 
 31 
of their family financial abilities. She underlined the significance of fair courts, 
separation of business and government and the importance of reforming the 
military. 
 
After the vote which confirmed Timoshenko's appointment for the post of the 
Prime-Minister, Yushchenko was the first to congratulate her. Speaker Litvin 
gave her a big bouquet of white roses. Timoshenko expressed her gratitude to 
everyone, saying that due to the collaboration between the government and the 
parliament, Ukraine now "sparkled in the world as a diamond." (2) 
 
BELARUS 
Flourishing state ideology 
Last week, the Charter-97 website reported that all scripts of a comical 
Belarusian TV show, KVN, which features humorous competitions between 
university student teams from around the country, now will have to pass an 
ideological test in respective universities' administrations before appearing on the 
air. In addition, student teams will be prohibited from making jokes about 
Lukashenko or even imitating his voice. Students were lectured on how much the 
President was doing for their country and how joking about the leader was 
disrespectful towards their Motherland. (3) 
 
The ideological education of the Belarusian nation, initiated by Lukashenko 
several years ago, seems to be taking on an ever more absurd form. Now, 
Belarusians are being deprived of the last outlet to ease their frustration with the 
current regime—an ability to laugh openly at it. In schools, on the jobs, on TV 
and radio, ideological education has been thriving for several years already. 
 
Education has been one of Lukashenko's main targets for promoting state 
ideology. One example of his methods of achieving universal patriotism is forcing 
state ideology students at the Mahilyow State Teacher's Training University to 
subscribe to state-owned newspapers. Students will be allowed to sit state 
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examinations only upon presentation of their subscription slips. Even after 
graduation, future Social Science and History teachers will be obliged to 
subscribe to a government mouthpiece—Sovetskaya Belorussiya and a local 
newspaper Mahilyowskiya vedamasti. (4) 
 
All Belarusian university students have been facing compulsory courses on the 
fundamentals of state ideology since 2003. Acclaimed philosophers, historians, 
political sociologists and economists were trained to teach such courses. History 
textbooks were rewritten on Lukashenko's order last year: those Lukashenko 
deemed "talentless people" were excised; his designated "patriots" remain in the 
textbooks. (5) 
 
The Yakub Kolas Lyceum, which had been attended by the children of many 
opposition members, was one of many Belarusian schools closed down by 
Lukashenko, who declared that "Education is one place where the opposition is 
not going to put down roots." (6) 
 
University and high school students are forced to join a government supported 
clone of the Soviet Komsomol organization, the Belarusian National Union of 
Youth (or popularly known as "Lukomol"—a blend of Lukashenko and 
Komsomol), membership in which is an unwritten prerequisite to entering 
university.  
 
In the work place, the ideological brainwashing is in full swing. Organizations now 
have ideology managers or deputy directors of ideological work. These people 
are required to hold regular political meetings and provide interpretations of the 
political events unfolding in the country. 
 
Media is yet another crucial means through which the government brings the 
teachings of the President to the people. Most TV channels are government 
mouthpieces. Government-affiliated organizations (about 80% of all in Belarus) 
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are forced to subscribe to state-owned newspapers. Recently, Lukashenko 
passed a law which forced all FM radio stations are required to fill 75 percent of 
their music airtime with "domestic products." (7) There are restrictions even on 
this law—Belarusian musicians who supported opposition candidates during the 
past parliamentary elections, are banned from radio and TV by an informal 
government order. (8) 
 
What is the essence Lukashenko's state ideology? What kind of citizen is he 
trying to cultivate and what type of state is he trying to create?  Lukashenko 
claims that the main purpose of teaching ideology is to help the young Belarusian 
state, which has gained independence for the first time in centuries, to 
consolidate into a strong patriotic nation. "A state isn't worth much if it does not 
have its own ideology. Our state is in its infancy and it should have a powerful 
immune system in the shape of ideology to ensure its continued survival," said 
Lukashenko while addressing students of the Belarusian State Academy of Arts 
two years ago. (9)  Indeed, given the tender age of the Belarusian nation and 
lack of history of sovereign statehood, it might be reasonable to create some 
common foundation for independent political and cultural development. 
 
Lukashenko's publicized ideals and his true motives and actions are drastically 
different, however. One of the priorities of Lukashenko's ideological teachings is 
cultivating civic and patriotic feelings in the population. The common definition of 
patriotism, however, is the love of one's Motherland, not unquestioned loyalty to 
a president, which seems to be Lukashenko's focus. Lukashenko does not hide 
the fact that his ideological teachings are a "campaign for the current regime." 
(10) "We must inoculate the people so that no one can lead them astray," said 
Lukashenko. "If any washed-up crazies come along, no one will listen to them. 
The people will be staunchly hostile to them."  In the past, the phrase "washed-
up crazies" was used by Lukashenko to describe the opposition. (11) 
Lukashenko also spoke against the artificial creation of a party of power. "This 
process should go and ripen on its own," said the Belarusian President. (12) 
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Reviving and strengthening use of the national language and celebration of 
culture is yet another established way to create a strong, patriotic nation. 
Unfortunately, Belarus' President suppressed the revival of a Belarusian culture 
throughout his decade-long presidency. During the past several years, 
Lukashenko closed 118 schools where Belarusian was used as the language of 
instruction, and 51 schools, where Belarusian was used together with Russian as 
the language of instruction. (13)  Numerous Belarusian language newspapers 
have been closed and even the official presidential website is written only in 
Russian and English, sending a strong message about the President's language 
preferences. 
 
It appears that many Belarusians are skeptical about Lukashenko's ideological 
teachings and realize that Belarusian state ideology is nothing more than 
brainwashing aimed at creating loyal followers of the current regime. That 
awareness is not leading to protest however. By not raising their voices, the 
Belarusians are condemning not only themselves, but also their children to 
remain small screws in the big dictatorial machine for years to come. 
 
Source notes: 
 
(1) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 04 Feb 05 via 
(http://www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/archive/2005/february/4/uriad.shtml). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Charter-97, 31 Jan 05 via (www.charter97.org). 
(4) Charter-97 website, 25 Jan 05 BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Belapan Analytic Bulletin, 28 Dec 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 10 Sep 2003 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Belapan Analytic Bulletin, 18 Jan 05 via ISI Emerging markets. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Belapan news agency, 14 Nov 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(13) Belapan Analytic Bulletin, 28 Dec 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
Aftermath of the loss of a revolutionary prime minister 
During the early morning hours of February 3, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab 
Zhvania and his friend Raul Usupov were found dead in Usupov's Tbilisi 
apartment.    Usupov served as the deputy governor of Shadi Kartli.    Zhvania, 
with President Mikheil Saakashvili and Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze, led 
Georgia through the "rose revolution."  He was known as perhaps the smartest 
and most strategic politician in the country.  
 
Authorities immediately suggested—even before medical testing had begun—
that Zhvania's death was a "tragic accident" caused by carbon monoxide 
poisoning.  Less than three hours after the prime minister's body was discovered, 
Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili told reporters, "This was apparently an 
accident." (1)  Merabishvili explained that the installation of a new "Iranian made" 
gas heater at Usupov's home just two days earlier was completed improperly.   
Later in the day, Justice Minister Levan Samkharauli confirmed that the carbon 
monoxide level in Zhvania's blood was abnormally high—more than twice the 
level considered fatal. (2) 
 
Nevertheless, the timing of Zhvania's death, combined with the country's long 
history of political violence, has led many in the media and some in the 
parliament to wonder if the cause was really as benign as authorities suggested.    
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In particular, opposition MP Alexander Shalamberidze alleged that Zhvania's 
death was masterminded "by outside forces," and implied that those forces 
originated in Russia.  (3) Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov immediately 
denied the accusation, and said, "The statements of those who rush to make 
judgments . . . will remain on their consciences." (4)  
 
Media outlets also questioned the quick conclusion of authorities.  The Georgian 
daily, 24 Hours, suggested that the actions of the authorities seemed to indicate 
an attempt to cover up evidence.  The paper noted that officials had shown 
journalists a video tape of the scene in Usupov's apartment "in an attempt to 
disavow doubts," but that "the tape was surely edited, which even more triggered 
a sense that it was made in an attempt to hide something." (5) 
 
The daily Rezonansi (Resonance) said, "This is very strange.  It is quite possible 
that Zhvania really could have died by carbon monoxide poisoning, but was it 
really a tragic accident?"  (6) 
 
The questions are logical, given the many critical and often dangerous issues 
that were being addressed directly by the Prime Minister at the time of his death.    
 
Most notably, Tbilisi's relations with the leaders of the Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian breakaway republics are at a precarious point.  On January 26, 
President Saakashvili announced that talks with Abkhaz representatives had 
been suspended because Abkhazia effectively had "left the negotiating table" by 
refusing to negotiate certain points.  In supporting the President's announcement, 
Zhvania said, "The most important thing is that a tragic fact must be recognized 
[in order] to continue talks on Abkhazia – ethnic cleansing of Georgians took 
place in Abkhazia in 1993." (7)  However, despite this statement, several peace 
plans have been proposed by Georgian government and NGO organizations, 
and Zhvania had been asked to generate support on both sides of the conflict for 
a final settlement proposal.   
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On January 26, President Saakashvili also announced a new South Ossetian 
peace initiative during a session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE).  The plan proposed broad autonomy for South Ossetia, 
including its own president, but the plan would keep the republic within Georgia. 
The proposal has many similarities to the agreement negotiated by Prime 
Minister Zhvania with Adjarian representatives in mid-2004, technically ending 
the armed conflict there. (8)  PACE members generally reacted positively to this 
latest initiative, with PACE Venice Commission member Gianni Buquichio calling 
it "a very good starting point which should facilitate settlement of this conflict." (9)  
 
Not surprisingly, South Ossetian representatives baulked at the initial 
announcement of the initiative.  "We have always said that the South Ossetian 
Republic does not refuse to hold dialogue Š but we do not intend to discuss the 
issue of the South Ossetian Republic's status," the self-titled South Ossetian 
Foreign Minister Alan Pliev said. (10)   
 
Still, South Ossetian leaders claimed good relations with Zhvania, and progress 
had been made in recent months.  On November 5, the republic's self-styled 
President, Eduard Kokoity, signed a demilitarization agreement with Zhvania 
and, at least publicly, remained committed to the plan.  On November 14, Kokoity 
said Zhvania led a "party of peace" in his efforts to solve the situation.  He 
suggested that other Georgian leaders, most notably then-Interior Minister 
(current Defense Minister) Irakli Okruashvili, "contribute to the tensions" and he 
implied a clear unwillingness to work with individuals outside the Prime Minister's 
circle. (11)  Following Zhvania's death, Kokoity's envoy told Interfax that a 
delegation from the republic would attend the funeral.  "We were talking about 
ways of settling the conflict with Zhvania, who tried to do a lot to normalize the 
situation in the region," Vazha Khachapuridze said. (12)  In fact, the Prime 
Minister reportedly had intended to focus primarily on the South Ossetian issue in 
the coming months. Kokoity's spokeswoman noted that Kokoity "does not rule 
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out the possibility that the negotiating process may now become more 
complicated." (13) 
 
The intention to focus on South Ossetia was given new impetus on February 1, 
when a car bomb exploded outside the police station in Gori, located just a few 
kilometers outside of South Ossetia, about 30 kilometers from the South 
Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali.  The bomb killed three police officers and injured 
27 civilians. (14) Almost immediately, some media speculated that South 
Ossetian separatists were to blame in an effort to derail recent progress in 
negotiations.  One day after the bombing, Saakashvili blamed "anti-peace forces" 
for the attack, and without naming South Ossetia, noted that the blast came after 
his government had "initiated peace proposals." (15)  A South Ossetian 
government spokeswoman, however, fervently denied involvement.  "What 
happened is terrible," Irina Gagloyeva said.  "We hope this won't be repeated.  
We definitely aren't guilty of it." (16) 
 
Soon after, Zhvania supported Gagloyeva's statement.  He suggested that the 
bombing was not planned by Georgians or South Ossetians and implied the 
involvement of a third country.  Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili also told 
reporters on February 1 that the attack seemed to be planned outside Georgia. 
(17)  At the same time, all government ministers urged calm.  On February 3, just 
hours before his death, Zhvania said, "The organizers of this terrorist act aimed 
to spread panic among the population and destabilize the situation.  However, we 
should respond with consolidation and effective activities."  (18)    
 
The bombing attack, coincidentally or not, came just days after what one Russian 
newspaper called a "summit of separatists" in Moscow.  On January 25, the 
leaders of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdneistria arrived in the Russian 
capital.  It is somewhat unclear with whom they met, and they claimed not to 
have coordinated their visits.  However, the Kommersant Russian daily 
newspaper reported that Kokoity met with Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri 
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Loshchinin, while newly elected Abkhaz "President" Sergei Bagapsh met with 
Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov.  Kommersant also noted that former Ukrainian 
presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich, who tacitly supported eastern 
Ukrainian separatist activity during his election campaign, was in Moscow at this 
time. (19)  
 
Zhvania's implication of a third country connection with the Gori bombing and his 
stepped-up negotiations with Kokoity have added to the questions surrounding 
his death.   Without Zhvania, South Ossetia negotiations will become more 
complicated, and the conflict could continue to plague Georgia indefinitely, 
draining its resources and having a destabilizing impact on its economic and 
political standing in the international community.   
 
Domestically, Georgia's attempts to consolidate its power ministries and curb 
police corruption—spearheaded by Zhvania—also likely will be impacted, at least 
initially.  Clearly, numerous parties stand to benefit from his death.  
 
Realizing that questions remain about Zhvania's death, Justice Minister Levan 
Samkharauli announced on February 4 that, although tests had revealed a lethal 
level of carbon monoxide (technically carboxyhemoglobin) in Zhvania's blood, 
there will be additional analysis.  "In other cases," he said, "a bio-chemical test 
would have been enough, but this is a case of high-ranking officials and it has 
been decided to make other tests within ten days." (20)   In addition, officials 
announced that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation will assist the 
government by conducting forensic tests on blood and tissue samples taken from 
Zhvania. (21)  In response to questions about possible tampering with the gas 
heater, Georgian Deputy General Prosecutor Giorgi Janashia told reporters on 
February 5 that they are questioning "dozens" of persons who may have 
information. (22)  
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In the meantime, Saakashvili is serving as Acting Prime Minister while he 
prepares to nominate a replacement for Zhvania.  He must do so by February 10, 
while a new cabinet must be formed by February 20.  
 
Media reports suggest fierce battles over the prime minister position between two 
"camps" represented in the government—one loyal to Saakashvili and one loyal 
to Zhvania.  The battle is one not only of personality, but also of strategic policy.  
"Zhvania was the person Saakashvili really listened to and in many cases, he 
managed to stop Saakashvili on the brink of fairly radical things," Paata 
Zakareishvili of the Center for Development and Cooperation in Tbilisi said. (24)  
Zhvania's camp may be searching for some way to continue its "checks and 
balances" function, as Zhvania did with Saakashvili over the past year. 
 
Currently, leading prime minister candidates include State Minister for Euro-
Atlantic Integration and Zhvania protégé Giorgi Baramidze, Defense Minister and 
Saakashvili supporter Irakli Okruashvili and Parliament Speaker Nino 
Burjanadze, who served as interim president following Eduard Shevardnadze's 
resignation.  Clearly, the most logical and acceptable choice would be Nino 
Burjanadze.  The Speaker was a member of the "rose revolution" leaders troika, 
and has been described repeatedly by Saakashvili as his most important partner, 
along with Zhvania.  She has shown a skill at not being pulled into one camp and 
has impressed both Georgians and Western organizations with her attempts to 
increase the power of the parliament to balance an extremely strong president.  
In addition, her relations with the separatist republics have been more productive 
than not.  
 
Saakashvili now faces a number of daunting challenges, and he must face them 
without the man on whom he depended heavily.  He will be tempted to lean on 
his supporters who urge strident action and moves that could undo the progress 
made over the last year.  It is in his and his country's interest to have an 
independent, balanced, tested partner by his side.  It is also in his interest to 
 41 
ensure that the circumstances surrounding the death of Zurab Zhvania are 
examined thoroughly and transparently.  Otherwise, any choice he makes for the 
premiership will be tainted even before the first cabinet meeting is convened.     
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Ukraine blowback 
Six weeks ago, parliamentary elections were held in Uzbekistan.  As was to be 
expected, the electoral process was questionable at best. Weeks before the 
balloting was due to be held, Uzbekistan's opposition bloc withdrew from the 
election, citing large-scale governmental fraud and intimidation. (1) The result of 
this action was that Uzbek voters were forced to choose between five political 
parties, all of which were pro-presidential. 
 
In spite of this "democratic setback," President Karimov conducted a campaign 
designed to present a democratic image to the outside world, insisting that the 
elections would be free and fair, and that all legitimate criticisms from the OSCE 
and other observers would be accepted. (2) 
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Immediately after the election, Karimov's rhetoric concerning democratization 
and the OSCE returned to its previously defiant note. Karimov noted that the 
OSCE had little right to pass judgment on Uzbekistan, as the country had joined 
the organization only because of its status as a post-Soviet Republic. In addition 
to attacking the OSCE, Karimov, in an exclusive interview with Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, claimed there would be no color revolution in Uzbekistan since the 
country lacked "protest potential" as well as any significant foreign influence. (3)  
Karimov's interview showed that he was worried by events in Ukraine this winter 
and was determined to ensure that revolution did not occur in Uzbekistan. His 
actions in excluding opposition parties must be viewed within the framework of 
domestic "protest potential." Karimov's evident concern with the spread of both 
unrest and willingness to demonstrate for political change made him extremely 
cautious. In the last two weeks, Karimov has begun to address the second of his 
concerns, namely foreign interference in Uzbek affairs. 
 
On January 28, President Karimov addressed the newly formed Parliament for 
the first time. A considerable portion of his speech was geared towards 
discussing the role of foreign NGO's in the country. Karimov stated that 
"inspections of some nongovernmental and non profit organizations that have 
been set up primarily with the help of certain foundations have shown that the 
activities of such organizations are significantly deviating from those stipulated in 
their statutes and programs and are pursuing specific objectives ordered by 
certain forces." (4) Pointing directly at the gallery occupied by Western (including 
U.S.) diplomats, Karimov added "we have enough power to curb aid groups that 
violate our laws. I hope those sitting in the balcony understand that." (5) 
Karimov's concerns regarding revolution are also affecting Uzbekistan's foreign 
policy.  Significantly, his remarks contained no references to the U.S./Uzbek 
relationship. Instead, he stressed the value to Uzbekistan of regional alliances 
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States. (6) 
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This pattern continued during Karimov's post-speech press conference, during 
which he emphasized that U.S. troops would leave the country upon completion 
of operations in Afghanistan, and indicated that due to "tendencies that are taking 
place in Ukraine and Georgia—and also in Moldova, which is a member of 
GUUAM," Uzbekistan might withdraw from the organization in the near future. (7) 
Finally, Karimov addressed the Strategic Partnership Treaty signed with Russia 
last year, stating that relations between  President Putin and himself were 
"strengthening" and that the two countries would together take "preventative 
measures in a complicated world filled with threats and challenges to the security 
of the people." (8) 
 
President Karimov's statements seem to indicate that events in Ukraine have 
caused deep concern and paranoia in Uzbekistan. Karimov clearly is concerned 
that the U.S. presence in-country might have 'unwanted' effects on the political 
situation. As such, he is less interested in regaining the financial aid cut off by the 
State Department last year, and with maintaining the U.S./Uzbek alliance, than 
he is in instituting all possible measures to ensure that Ukraine 2004 does not 
become Uzbekistan 2005. 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Kyrgyz parliamentary elections are due to be held on February 27. In the last two 
months there has been considerable political activity in the country indicating that 
Kyrgyzstan may follow a dynastic succession. As yet, President Askar Akaev has 
refused to be drawn on whether he would run for a third Presidential term. But 
both Akaev's son and daughter—the latter more politically experienced—have 
been nominated as candidates for the polls. (9) Significantly, Bermet Akaeva is 
running in a constituency previously occupied by one of Kyrgyzstan's most 
important opposition leaders, Roza Otunbayev, a former Foreign Minister and 
current co-leader of Ata-Jurt. When Otunbayeva was excluded from the 
elections, allegedly on the grounds of residency violations, (10) protests occurred 
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outside the Parliament in Bishkek, which lasted several days. President Akaev's 
ostensible response to the demonstrators was to dismiss them as agitators 
wishing to re-create the "Orange Revolution." Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev 
also addressed the demonstrators, warning them that the government would be 
prepared to use force on February 27 to enforce "political stability," should such 
action be necessary. (11) The war of words has continued in recent weeks, 
coinciding with the official start of electoral campaigning on February 2.  
 
President Akaev has expressed similar concerns to those aired by Uzbekistan's 
President Karimov regarding events during the winter in Ukraine. In an interview 
given to Nezavisimaya gazeta, and published online in Britain by the BBC, Akaev 
alleged that the United States government is secretly supporting Ata-Jurt and 
Otunbayeva's candidacy (12) —an allegation which was denied strenuously by 
Otunbayeva. (13) Believing U.S. involvement to be a key element, Akaev has 
sought to place his rule firmly in the context of alliance with the United States. 
Akaev claimed that the "emergence of political disorder" in the country would 
have detrimental effects on Central Asia as a whole and specifically on 
Kyrgyzstan's position as an "active" participant in the Global War on Terrorism. 
(14) As such, his tactics are different from those adopted by President Karimov. 
Akaev has chosen to stress Kyrgyzstan's usefulness to the United States in order 
to prevent what he believes is foreign interference in internal affairs: Kyrgyz 
"stability"—represented, of course, by himself—is "best of all" in the United 
States' interest. (15) 
 
The idea of meddling or fraud (both foreign and domestic) has been a persistent 
part of the Kyrgyz government's rhetoric over the last two weeks: Prime Minister 
Tanayev warned the OSCE on January 31 that "interference" (16) in the polls by 
any observer missions would not be tolerated, while also promising that the 
government itself would not intervene in the electoral process. (17) 
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The Kyrgyz leadership also is seeking to ensure that revolutionary change does 
not take place, by appealing to the country's most important demographic, 
namely the youth. Akaev's first official campaign business was to attend a youth 
rally in Bishkek. Addressing almost 3,000 school children, Akaev warned that the 
upcoming elections were a "test" for them, and told them that Kyrgyz youth "have 
already demonstrated their immunity to the sickly foreign rose, orange and yellow 
viruses that some home grown opposition figures are trying to implant in our soil." 
(18) Akaev also used the rally as a venue to attempt to assure the youth that the 
elections would be fair, noting that ballot boxes would be marked and counted in 
a transparent fashion, and that voters would have their fingers stained with ink in 
order to ensure that no voter falsification takes place. (19)  
 
Realistically, the chances of a fair election in Kyrgyzstan are virtually nil: not only 
has Otunbayeva been excluded, but the vote will also in large part be conducted 
using the same ŒSaylau' computerized voting system used last September in 
Kazakhstan, and which is at the center of fraud allegations in that country. (20) 
 
As in Uzbekistan, the reverberations of Ukraine are causing deep concern in 
Bishkek. But in contrast to Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz opposition is increasingly 
vocal, with Otunbayeva stating that Kyrgyzstan has "matured" to the point where 
it is ripe for peaceful revolution. (21) The real test of Akaev's intentions will come 
on February 27 and 28, once election results are announced: if opposition groups 
make significant gains, will Akaev remove himself from the presidential picture in 
the fall? Most importantly, Akaev has always styled himself as Central Asia's 
most moderate leader. As such, how will he behave if protests emerge after the 
elections; will he use force to suppress dissent, or will he allow peaceful 
expressions of dissent to occur? Based on current statements, and the level of 
concern being aired at the highest levels of the Kyrgyz government, the 
prediction must be that protests will be stopped—violently, if necessary.  
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